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ABSTRACT
This article offers a new perspective on insurance law by examining
and combining two basic features of insurance and insurance law: the nature
of the insurance contract and the fact that most insurance law issues concern
a disputed claim. Insurance law scholars are fond of reconceptualizing their
subject. Insurance policies and insurance law have been likened to a means
of public utility regulation, a product warranty, a social institution, or,
perhaps mostly simply, a thing. This article represents another
conceptualization of the subject, and one that may be less foreign to the
subject and closer to the reality of the formation and performance of
insurance relationships.
Every insurance policy is a contract between the policyholder and
the insurer. Fundamentally, however, almost every insurance law problem,
dispute, or doctrine is really about paying or not paying claims. These two
features—contract and claim—are at the heart of most insurance law
disputes. The significance of insurance as contract is generally recognized,
but the centrality of claims, less so. The article examines each of them
separately and then combines them. Doing so provides a perspective on a
large number of insurance law issues, and that perspective should change the
courts’ approach to a number of issues and doctrines. The focus is on
personal lines, particularly first-party insurance, but the analysis also has
implications in other settings.
The article first presents the contract and claim analysis. It then
applies the analysis to several common issues in insurance law. The
illustrations come from three different points in the life of an insurance
policy. The first concerns a formation issue: when an insurer may use
misstatements by a policyholder in the application process to avoid coverage.
The second, and most general, addresses interpretation issues that concern
the insurer’s performance of the insurance contract. The third concerns
issues of policyholder and insurer performance after a claim is filed—the
false swearing rule and the law of insurance bad faith. All three reinforce the
*

Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School; Co-Director,
Rutgers Center for Risk and Responsibility. My thanks to James Davey, Rick
Swedloff, and participants in the Insurance Fraud Symposium at the
University of Southampton School of Law for their comments.
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insight that every doctrinal issue involves a conception of the insurance
contract and arises because of a disputed claim. The discussion demonstrates
that courts sometimes use similar analysis, describes those tendencies,
suggests why they are incomplete, and uses the contract and claim analysis
to make them explicit and more comprehensive. Other courts take quite
different approaches; contrasting those approaches with the contract and
claim analysis demonstrates what they get wrong. The result is both a
demonstration of the usefulness of the article’s analysis and a beginning
catalog of how it can reshape insurance law doctrine.
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This article offers a new perspective on insurance law by examining
and combining two basic features of insurance and insurance law: the nature
of the insurance contract and the fact that most insurance law issues concern
a disputed claim.
Every insurance policy is a contract between the policyholder and
the insurer. As such, many of the disputes between policyholders and
insurers come to court framed as contract disputes. Many disputes are about
rules and principles of interpretation. How is the policy term of “an
occurrence” applied? When should policy language be read in accordance
with the reasonable expectations of a policyholder and how are those
expectations created? Other doctrines fill gaps in policy language or limit
pure application of policy language. When does estoppel or waiver permit
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an insurer’s actions to trump policy language? Is anti-concurrent causation
language void as against public policy because of a conflict with the doctrine
of efficient proximate cause?
Fundamentally, however, almost every insurance law problem,
dispute, or doctrine is really about paying or not paying claims. The rules of
insurance policy interpretation determine whether facts giving rise to a claim
are within policy language. Estoppel and waiver are asserted by a
policyholder to prevent an insurer from denying a claim otherwise excluded
from the terms of the policy. The doctrine of reasonable expectations, void
as against public policy, and more rules and principles of insurance law
become relevant and are given effect only because a policyholder disputes
an insurer’s denial of its obligation to pay a claim.
These two features—contract and claim—are entailed in most
insurance law disputes. The significance of insurance as contract is generally
recognized, but the centrality of claims, less so. The article examines each of
them separately and then combines them. Doing so provides a perspective
on a large number of insurance law issues, and that perspective should
change the courts’ approach to a number of issues and doctrines. The focus
is on personal lines, particularly first-party insurance, but the analysis also
has implications in other settings.
I.

THE CONTRACT AND CLAIM ANALYSIS
A.

CONTRACT

The non-controversial starting point is that an insurance policy is a
contract. The policy is created by a voluntary market transaction between the
insurer and the policyholder, but like every other contract, it is made
enforceable and regulated by law. Law regulates insurance policies through
statutes, administrative regulations, and judicial decisions. It does so with
two aims.1
The first aim is to improve the contracting process itself. This aim is
concerned with improving the conditions of the many individual transactions
through which insurance is bought and sold, thereby improving the insurance
market as a whole. It defines the rules of contract formation, attempts to cure
1

This structure is roughly parallel to Abraham’s “two fundamental
questions” of insurance law: the enforcement of policy language (to which I
would add enforcement of a contractual obligation not clearly specified in
the policy) and “‘public law’ values.” Kenneth S. Abraham, Four
Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 656 (2013).

162

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol.25

deficiencies in the process of assent, and addresses impediments to full and
fair contracting such as moral hazard and adverse selection that potentially
undermine the market for insurance.
The second aim is to advance public policies that are less
immediately tied to the contracting process. There are a broad range of such
policies including, for example, preventing discrimination in the
underwriting process2 and providing compensation for tort victims through
liability insurance.3
This simple framing poses several complex questions. First, if an
insurance policy is a contract, and what kind of contract is it, and what are
the implications of that question for insurance law? Second, how should
insurance contracts be regulated? This article mostly puts aside the second
form of regulation, in service of external public policies, but that still leaves
a lot of ground in which law can structure and intervene in insurance
relationships.
The most obvious and universally recognized feature of the
insurance policy as a contract is that it is a standard form contract, or a
contract of adhesion.4 The features that define the policy as this type of
contract are:
1. The contract is embodied in the written policy documents.
2. The policy is drafted by the insurer.
3. The policyholder is unlikely or unable to read or understand the
terms, a fact known to the insurer.
4. The insurer enters into many such policies.
5. The policyholder enters into few such transactions.
6. Except for a few terms such as policy limits, deductible, and a
small number of endorsements, the contract is take-it-or-leave2

E.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, MODEL UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES ACT §4.G (2004), http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-880.pdf.
3
See Odolecki v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 264 A.2d 38, 42 (N.J.
1970).
4
The discussion focuses on personal lines and other insurance sold to
less commercially sophisticated and empowered insureds largely on a takeit-or-leave-it basis. The practice of contracting for commercial lines covers
a wide span, from transactions that largely track the model of adhesion
contract described in the text to individually negotiated manuscript policies.
The contract and claim analysis is most relevant in cases that resemble that
model but it also informs other situations.
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it.5
7. The policyholder’s principal obligation is to pay the premium.
8. The insurer’s obligations are conditional on loss and are more
extensive than the policyholder’s if there is a loss.
Features 1 through 6 are common to all form contracts and features
7 and 8 are distinctive to insurance contracts but certainly not limited to
them.
That an insurance policy is a standard form contract does not suggest
that it is unenforceable or that its terms should be disregarded. One of the
central questions of modern contract law is how to regard such contracts.6
But because an insurance policy is a form contract, it is problematic to treat
the policy as if it embodied the agreement of a detailed bargain between
equal and informed parties, and the law needs to inquire more deeply into
the nature of the insurance relation beyond the four corners of the policy.
With that as a noncontroversial starting point, think about the
insurance policy as a contract which, like every other contract, has two key
moments: formation and performance. At each of these moments, consider
separately the position of the insurer and the policyholder.
1. Formation
An insurance policy is a product of an insurer’s actuarial
classification of risks and calculation of their probability and extent; a
drafting process to express those risks in the language of the policy; and the
underwriting of a particular policyholder under the classified, expressed risks
based on information provided by the policyholder and information available
to the insurer from its own and external sources. At the point of formation,
therefore, for the insurer the policy represents an effort to embody the
substantial terms of the relationship between it and the policyholder. That is,
in the language of relational contract theory,7 the insurance relationship for
5

Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (1983).
6
See generally NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND
RAMIFICATIONS (2013); MARGARET J. RADIN, BOILERPRINT: THE FINE
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013); Friedrich
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Rakoff, supra note 5.
7
Ian R. Macneil, Restatement Second of Contracts and Presentation, 60
VA. L. REV. 589, 610 (1974).
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the insurer is substantially presentiated in the policy, with the terms of future
performance delineated at the moment of formation.
Of course, the written policy, as complex and detailed as it may be,
necessarily is incomplete. It does not include every conceivable element of
the parties’ relationship, and what it does state may be vague, ambiguous, or
otherwise uncertain of application. Therefore, the express policy terms are
supplemented and explained by industry understandings, regulatory
requirements, and judicial interpretations, all of which are within the
insurer’s knowledge and expertise and none of which are within the
policyholder’s knowledge or expertise. If there is a loss, the insurer expects
to pay what is owed, with “what is owed” defined by the terms of the policy
as understood by surrounding industry, regulatory, and legal norms.
Even with the insurer’s knowledge and expertise, of course,
uncertainty will remain about application of the policy to particular
circumstances. But the insurer’s uncertainty is reduced because of an
essential feature of the policy: it is one among many such policies. For the
insurer, the policy has value precisely because it is part of a large pool of
policies that insure similar but non-correlated risks. At the point of
formation, the insurer anticipates the possibility of loss. The possibility of
loss for an individual policy is trivial; what matters is the individual loss as
part of a portfolio of risk.
Like all form contracts, an insurance policy serves “to stabilize [the
insurer’s] external market relationships . . . and to serve the needs of a
hierarchical and internally segmented structure.”8 Externally,
standardization by contract reduces the transaction costs of contracting and
aids the insurer in calculating and controlling risks. The particular form of
external control that is most valuable for the insurer is the limiting and
defining of underwriting risk, often in terms favorable to the insurer. In this
way, it allows profitable risk spreading. Internally, standard terms are
elements of organizational coordination and control, again reducing costs by
making operations more predictable. One of the important features of an
insurer’s bureaucracy is the use of policy terms, among other systems, to
limit the discretion of sales and claims personnel and to structure their
interactions with policyholders.
At the point of formation, the policyholder is in a different situation.
The insurance policy involves minimal planning by the policyholder,
typically focusing on price, policy limits, deductible, a vague sense of the
insurer’s reputation, convenience, and perhaps a few items of coverage.
8

Rakoff, supra note 5, at 1220.
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Indeed, often the policyholder is unable to agree to (or even have access to)
the terms of the policy; personal lines insurers almost never provide a copy
of the policy prior to purchase.9 An intermediary, an agent or broker, can
provide the policyholder better understanding of the content of the policy at
the time of formation, but it is rare that the content will be provided in great
detail, certainly in personal lines and often even in commercial lines.10 The
policyholder engages at most in what Karl Llewellyn called “blanket assent”:
What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered
terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but one thing more. That
one thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not
unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his form, which do
not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.”11
The policyholder, rather than agreeing to the detailed terms, invests
in a relationship of security,12 a relationship that is formally created by the
policy but that is socially constructed and promoted by insurers as a group.13
The reasonable policyholder understands that relationship does not
guarantee coverage for every conceivable loss. For example, certain risks
that are highly correlated to many policyholders or those that pose excessive
problems of moral hazard, may be excluded, for example. With those
exceptions, however, the policyholder has a legitimate expectation of broad

9

See Jay M. Feinman, The Regulation of Insurance Claim Practices, 5
U.C. IRVINE. L. REV. 1319, 1321-23 (2015).
10
Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman, Insurance Agents in the TwentyFirst Century: The Problem of Biased Advice, Daniel Schwarcz & Peter
Siegelman EDS, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE
LAW 36 (2015) (arguing that insurance agents can and often do fail to
effectively serve consumers’ interests).
11
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALS 370 (1960). See Rakoff, supra, at 1206.
12
“The final and perhaps most significant characteristic of insurance
contracts, differentiating them from ordinary, negotiated commercial
contracts, is the increasing tendency of the public to look upon the insurance
policy not as a contract but as a special form of chattel. The typical applicant
buys ‘protection’ much as he buys groceries.” 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
34 (Walter H.E. Jaeger eds., 1957).
13
The ubiquity of insurance company advertising and the familiarity of
insurance company slogans — “Nationwide is on your side,” sung to its wellknown jingle — illustrate.
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coverage.14
For the policyholder the insurance policy has value prior to loss
because it provides this expectation of security. If a loss occurs, it is likely
to be unique and potentially catastrophic; the policyholder, unlike the
insurer, does not maintain a portfolio of risk for substantial losses in any
meaningful sense. The policyholder’s expectation is that if there is a loss the
relationship of reasonable security will be realized. That expectation
involves both vague ideas about the extent of coverage and perhaps a few
specific terms and a general belief that there will be a reasonable process of
adjusting the loss.
At the moment of formation, therefore, the insurer and the
policyholder have different understandings of the policy and the insurance
relation, so the policy serves different functions for each of them. That
suggests a starting point for further analysis: it is an error to assume that the
policy presentiates the terms of the parties’ agreement, so it is an error to
invest total weight or even too much weight on the express terms as precisely
defining their rights and duties. Terms are a viable starting point but
problematic as an ending point.
2. Performance
Now consider the essential moment of performance in an insurance
contract—when a loss potentially within coverage occurs and the
policyholder files a claim. As in any contract, there are risks of dispute over
the performance due and of eventual nonperformance.
Two potential sources of failure to perform in other contracts are
absent in insurance contracts: unavoidable breach, where a party is unable to
perform, and efficient breach, where a party chooses to breach and
compensate its contracting partner to take advantage of a better opportunity.
Instead, a failure to perform may arise from a coverage dispute that arises
because of disagreement about some mix of the interpretation of policy
language, the facts of the claim, and controlling law. Or a dispute may be
about one of the parties’ performance obligations at the point of claim, such
as an insurer’s obligations in processing a claim or a policyholder’s duty of
cooperation. These disputes reflect features of the formation process such as
the policy’s incompleteness, leading to disputes over the performance owed,
and the asymmetries of agreement due to the policy’s status as a form
contract, reflected in the parties’ different expectations about the policy at
14

Mark Geistfeld, Interpreting the Rules of Insurance Contract
Interpretation, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 371, 386-91 (2015).
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the time of formation. Often this will be caused by a relational expectation
of coverage by the policyholder that the insurer believes is inconsistent with
the express terms of the written policy.
The sources of these disputes vary. Some reflect good faith disputes
about the interpretation of policy terms, the facts giving rise to the claim, or
uncertain or undecided issues of applicable law. Others may arise from a
careless failure to adhere to policy requirements or even deliberate
advantage-seeking behavior. At least the last two sources can be seen as
agency problems; each party has a degree of discretion in its performance
which raises the risk that it will not respect its contractual commitment and
instead will act in its own interest.15 Agency problems create the potential
for opportunistic behavior. Opportunism can be defined narrowly—
Williamson’s famous “self-interest seeking with guile”16—or broadly, to
include “any contractual conduct by one party contrary to the other party’s
reasonable expectations.”17
As with formation, consider separately the position of the insurer
and the policyholder as to their risks and their means of controlling those
risks.
For the insurer, the insurance policy represents one element of a
portfolio of potential losses that are the basis of its business. The risk for the
insurer at the point of claim is that its planning will be upset either by an
unanticipated gap in the policy as applied to a claim or by an action of the
policyholder. A gap arises because of the incompleteness of the policy in
addressing all possible states of affairs, a discrepancy between the
policyholder’s understanding of the coverage and the terms of the policy as
interpreted by the insurer, or action of the policyholder that impacts the
insurer’s risk allocation. The policyholder’s action may occur at the time of
formation, by misrepresenting a material fact upon which the insurer
underwrites the policy. The action may occur subsequent to formation but
before the loss, by engaging in risky behavior inconsistent with its
obligations under the policy that causes or contributes to the loss. Or the
15

See The Regulation of Insurance Claim Practices, supra note 9, at
1323-25.
16
Oliver E. Williamson, Opportunism and Its Critics, 14
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 97, 97 (1993).
17
George M. Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract
Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 941, 957 (1992). See also, The Regulation of
Insurance Claim Practices, supra note 9, at 1325-26. For a survey of “the
opportunism tradition,” see Cohen, supra, at 953- 61.
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action may occur after the loss, such as negligently or intentionally
misrepresenting information about the cause or severity of loss.
The insurer can attempt to control these risks at the time of
formation, prior to the loss, or after the loss. It can address the gap by
clarifying and extending the language of the policy and prospectively
considering the interpretation and gap-filling functions of the law as
supplements to the written policy.18 To avoid discrepancies between the
policyholder’s and the insurer’s understanding, the insurer can be clearer and
more forthcoming in the marketing of the policy. To control the
policyholder’s behavior and therefore to reduce the problem of policyholder
agency, the insurer can engage in extensive information-gathering and
underwriting practices. Policy terms, limits, and deductibles aim to reduce
the insured’s moral hazard and provide the basis for defenses to coverage.
After a loss, it can engage in extensive investigation, information gathering,
and information sharing to ascertain facts. Most importantly, it can deny a
claim in whole or part; doing so, or even expressly or implicitly threatening
to do so, increases a policyholder’s cost of pursuing the claim and therefore
increases the cost of nonperformance and diminishes the value of the claim.
For the policyholder, one risk is that its inchoate expectation of
coverage and security will be disappointed by the insurer’s assertion of
contrary policy terms at the point of claim. Another risk occurs because the
insurer’s duties with respect to processing the claim are poorly defined in the
policy; the policyholder therefore is at risk that the insurer will fail to
conform to the policyholder’s expectations.
The policyholder has very limited means to control those risks. It
can attempt to become better informed about the terms of the policy at the
time of formation, but that usually does not happen in part because the
burden of doing so is disproportionate to the anticipated return. Because the
policy is an adhesion contract, the policyholder cannot include terms that
reduce the ambiguity or the insurer’s agency. If a loss is significant, the
policyholder is dependent on the success of the claim. Unlike other contracts,
it cannot procure a substitute and sue for the added expense because
insurance is unavailable for a loss that already has occurred. The last resort
is litigation, which is expensive, protracted, and often not fully
compensatory.
In short, both parties are subject to agency problems that extend to
opportunism. The problems cannot be eliminated, but the consequences of
them for the policyholder are much more severe and the insurer has a much

18

Macneil, supra note 7, at 606.
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greater opportunity to control the risk posed by the policyholder than vice
versa.
B.

CLAIM

The discussion so far has focused on the insurance policy as contract.
It described the policy as a form contract and considered the parties’ situation
in regard to the contract at the point of formation and the point of
performance. Now consider the second point from a different perspective:
the dynamics of the claim process. The insurance claim process exhibits
common features that distinguish insurance contracts as a group from other
types of contract. These features concern the advantages each party
possesses in the claim process and the means the other party has in
responding to those advantages.
The insurer initially is at a disadvantage relative to the policyholder
in the claim process because the policyholder controls most of the
information relevant to the claim. The insurer depends on the policyholder
to provide the information completely and accurately in order for it to
evaluate coverage and the extent of the loss. Typically, the insurer responds
to this disadvantage by not relying exclusively on information provided by
the policyholder. It may send an adjuster to assess the loss, and it has formal
mechanisms to obtain information, such as requiring a Proof of Loss or
Examination Under Oath, and informal mechanisms to enforce the
policyholder’s duty of cooperation, such as the leverage created by
sequential performance.
In a number of other respects, the dynamics of the claim process put
the policyholder at a disadvantage relative to the insurer.
First, the gap in knowledge about the terms of the policy between
the insurer and the policyholder at the time of formation is mirrored at the
time of claim. The policy description of the terms of coverage and the
insurer’s obligations are both technical and incomplete, so the policyholder
is unable to fully understand what it is owed. In many cases, the
policyholder’s expectations about the relation vest the insurer with expertise,
so the insurer’s determination is effectively final even if it is objectively
questionable. Therefore, even if a claim is incorrectly denied or the insurer
otherwise fails to meet its obligations, the policyholder is either unlikely to
perceive the failure or unable to do anything about it.19
19

This is an example of the flatness of the grievance pyramid. See
William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and

170

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol.25

Second, the insurance relation combines sequential performance
with the lack of substitute performances.20 The insured renders its principal
performance first—paying the premium. In the event of a loss, the insured
cannot withhold its performance to provide an incentive for the company to
fully perform its own obligation in the claim process. Moreover, unlike in
many contracts, the policyholder cannot procure an adequate substitute
performance, sue for any added cost, and, at least in concept, be made whole
by the provision of damages; no insurer will sell insurance to compensate for
a loss that has already occurred.21
Third, the insurer’s duties in the claim process are not fully specified
in the policy or elsewhere even in cases in which the policy terms clearly
provide coverage. A typical HO-3 homeowners policy, for example, only
requires the company to pay claims within sixty days of agreement or
adjudication and to participate in appraisal; otherwise, it delineates no duties
concerning processing of a claim.22 Even when a statute appears to narrowly
specify a duty, the specification is usually qualified by a vague term such as
“good faith.”23 Indeed, it would be hard to specify the insurer’s duties
because they necessarily rest on vague concepts such as promptness and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 L. & SOC. REV.
631 (1980).
20
Jay M. Feinman, The Insurance Relationship as Relational Contract
and the “Fairly Debatable” Rule for First-Party Bad Faith, 46 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 553, 558-59 (2009).
21
“[A] breach in the employment context does not place the employee
in the same economic dilemma that an insured faces when an insurer in bad
faith refuses to pay a claim or to accept a settlement offer within policy
limits. When an insurer takes such actions, the insured cannot turn to the
marketplace to find another insurance company willing to pay for the loss
already incurred.” Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 396 (Cal.
1988).
22
INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., HOMEOWNERS 3—SPECIAL FORM, 1, 15
(1999), http://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/HO3_sample.pdf. The
homeowner, by contrast, is subject to eight specified duties, including
prompt notice, cooperation in investigation, and submission of proof of loss.
Id. at 13.
23
In Tennessee, for example, an insurer is subject to a statutory penalty
if it fails to pay a claim within sixty days of a demand by the policyholder,
but only if “the refusal to pay the loss was not in good faith.” TENN. CODE
ANN. §56-7-105.
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reasonableness.24
Fourth, even if the insurer’s obligations are relatively clear, legal
enforcement of the insurer’s duties is difficult and often impossible to obtain.
For small claims, hiring a lawyer or a public adjuster likely is not worth the
expense or within the policyholder’s means. For all claims, the insured’s
remedy is limited to the recovery of the benefits due under the policy and
perhaps interest at the statutory rate. That remedy does not give the insured
the promised benefits until the litigation is concluded, perhaps years later,
during which time the insured is likely to have suffered financial and
emotional hardship and therefore to have lost the security for which it
contracted.25
Fifth, all of the problems described above are exacerbated by the
likelihood of the policyholder’s emotional and financial vulnerability
following the loss. The purpose of the insurance is to provide funds to repair,
rebuild, or otherwise compensate, which would otherwise be unavailable at
the time of loss. In a large number of cases, the policyholder’s need for
settlement of the claim provides its own incentive.
The dynamics of the claim process presents agency problems; each
party has a degree of discretion in its performance which raises the risk that
it will not respect its contractual commitment and instead will act in its own
interest. Agency problems create the potential for opportunistic behavior.
Policyholder opportunism includes misrepresentation at the time of
application or the time of loss, the most egregious version of which is fraud.
Insurer opportunism may take the form of profiting from pre-loss behavior;
examples would include establishing the basis for a misrepresentation
defense or drafting unexpectedly limiting policy language. Or it may occur
after the loss, by delaying or denying payment of a valid claim in whole or
part. The opportunism may be intentional and systematic, or it may be merely
negligent.
For the policyholder, insurance presents a classic case of potential
opportunism. One party has fully performed and has substantial sunk costs,
24

As expressed in the Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, for
example, a company must “adopt and implement reasonable standards for
the prompt investigation and settlement of claims arising under its policies.”
MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT §4.C (NAT’L ASS’N
OF INS. COMM’RS 1997).
25
“Although the insured is not without remedies if he disagrees with the
insurer, the very invocation of those remedies detracts significantly from the
protection or security which was the object of the transaction.” Rawlings v.
Apodaca v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 570 (Ariz. 1986).
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the policyholder has paid its premium and invested in a relation of security,
and the other party’s performance comes later and is not well-defined. The
insurer has to pay if there is a loss covered by the policy and has to observe
“reasonable” claim practices in doing so. The benefit to the insurer from
opportunistic behavior, of course is that it increases its profits by reducing
its claim costs and increasing the assets available to it to invest.
Because of the dynamics of the claim process described above, there
are fewer effective checks on insurer opportunism than on policyholder
opportunism. Litigation by the policyholder is unlikely in many cases and
impossible in others. Because the insurer is managing a portfolio of such
cases, paying damages, even extracontractual damages, in a portion of the
cases does not outweigh the benefits of opportunism in a larger number of
other cases. Because empirical data on claim practices is not publicly
available,26 an individual insurer’s reputation is established by advertising
and other intangible means, and consumer choice is more focused on price
than quality, the market does not effectively deter opportunistic behavior.
Nor do regulators effectively monitor market conduct.27
Today the extent to which insurers act opportunistically is
controversial. Insurers and industry representatives acknowledge that
occasional mistakes are made but deny that there is systematic abuse.
Industry critics argue that companies have increasingly viewed the claims
process as a profit center.28 For present purposes, it is only necessary to
observe that opportunism can be broadly defined29 and the potential for
opportunism is inherent.

26

The NAIC Market Conduct Surveillance Model Law § 7 and the
National Conference of Insurance Legislators’ Market Conduct Annual
Statement Model Act § 8 provide that claims data reported to or collected by
insurance commissioners are privileged and confidential. For adoptions, see
e.g., Ariz. Ann. Rev. Stat. § 20-158; Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431:2D-107;
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3916; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 27-71-8; Ann. Rev.
Code of Wash. § 48.37.080.
27
See Feinman, supra note 9, at 1326-40.
28
See generally JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY
INSURANCE COMPANIES DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO
ABOUT IT (2010).
29
See Cohen, supra note 17, at 957.
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CONTRACT AND CLAIM COMBINED

Now consider together the insurance policy as a form contract and
the dynamics of the claim process. The insurance policy is a standard form
contract, or an adhesion contract. The policy takes on different functions at
the point of formation for the policyholder and the insurer. At the point of
performance, each is subject to different risks and possesses different means
of controlling those risks. Seen differently, the point of performance involves
claim dynamics that both increase the risks, which may be seen as agency
bleeding into opportunism, and provide means of responding to the risks. In
the claim process, the risks and responses put the policyholder at a systematic
disadvantage relative to the insurer.
This analysis suggests that courts should further the regulatory role
of law in improving the contracting process, not in the sense of improving
formation ex ante but in the sense of realizing the parties’ legitimate
expectations.30 The analysis contributes to that goal in several ways.
The contract and claim analysis clarifies the nature of the insurance
policy as a contract. There is a tendency to regard the policy as the core of
the relationship and everything else as peripheral to its construction.
Therefore, the terms are the starting point and given great weight. Everything
else—expectations created outside the written policy, public policies,
measures against opportunism—necessarily carry less weight and have to
struggle against the written terms. The two parts of the contract and claim
analysis work against that construction. The contract is not constituted only
by the written policy, and the differing conceptions of the contract by the
policyholder and the insurer at the point of formation also needs to be
considered.
Moreover, the problems of claim dynamics are also relevant to the
resolution of disputes, even disputes about what are traditionally seen as
formation or interpretation issues. The risks of agency and opportunism are
broadly relevant, as is the relative advantage of the insurer in the claim
process. This provides a perspective through which insurance law issues
should be seen. In considering insurance law issues across a range of
doctrines, courts should be sensitive to the nature of the contract relation as
described here and the importance of claim process dynamics. This is
30

“Legitimate” expectations, of course, are not just those of individual
parties but reflect conceptions of reasonableness for policyholders and
insurers as a whole. As Corbin proclaimed, “The Main Purpose of Contract
Law Is the Realization of Reasonable Expectations Induced by Promises.”
ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §1 (1952).
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something like the use of general principles or policy arguments to shape
doctrine. Particular issues are approached through an established doctrinal
framework—categories, rules, sub-rules, and exceptions, for example—but
the application of the elements of the framework is shaped by purposes and
policies. The contract and claim analysis serves as a lens through which the
problems would be seen or a weighty element in the balancing process in
which courts engage to shape and apply doctrine.
This does not suggest that insurers should lose every case. Surely
there are cases in which policy language should be interpreted to deny
coverage,31 cases in which the insurer has observed fair claim practices, cases
in which the policyholder has acted opportunistically, and more. This is
obvious but it is worth stating to suggest the complexity of the analysis.
Nor should the contract and claim analysis be used on a case-by-case
basis. Courts are ill equipped to consider in a particular case what the full
context and expectations of the parties’ contract were and whether an insurer
has engaged in opportunistic behavior. Nor would it be worth the judicial
resources to do so, because the more individualized the inquiry, the less
impact it has on the pool of potential cases. And a case-by-case approach
would undermine the general relevance of the resolution of particular
disputes; certainty and predictability are important.
Finally, it could be possible to use the analysis to shape some
insurance law doctrines but not others. For example, the next Part argues that
the analysis supports the reasonableness standard for violation of claim
practices (“bad faith”) that is used by a minority of jurisdictions rather than
the majority rule of “fairly debatable.” It might be the case that the article’s
analysis is strongest on that issue but less persuasive on some other issue—
for example, the rules about policyholder misrepresentation at the time of
application that also are discussed later. In fact, the analysis in the article has
sway across the entire field of insurance law.
II.

APPLICATIONS
ANALYSIS

OF

THE

CONTRACT

AND

CLAIM

To illustrate and amplify the contract and claim analysis, this Part
discusses several common issues in insurance law. The discussion
demonstrates that courts sometimes use similar analysis, describes those
tendencies, suggests why they are incomplete, and uses the contract and
claim analysis to make them explicit and more comprehensive. Other courts
take quite different approaches; contrasting those approaches with the
31

See infra text accompanying notes 62–66.
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contract and claim analysis demonstrates what they get wrong. The result is
both a demonstration of the usefulness of this Article’s analysis and a
beginning catalog of how it can reshape insurance law doctrine.
The illustrations come from three different points in the life of an
insurance policy. The first concerns a formation issue: when an insurer may
use misstatements by a policyholder in the application process to avoid
coverage. The second, and most general, addresses interpretation issues that
concern the insurer’s performance of the insurance contract. The third
concerns issues of policyholder and insurer performance at the end-point of
the relation, after a claim is filed—the false swearing rule and the regulation
of the insurer’s claim practices. All three reinforce the notion that every
doctrinal issue involves a conception of the insurance contract and arises
because of a disputed claim.
A.

AT FORMATION: REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES

One area in which there is a developed body of law that illustrates
the conflict between traditional concepts and the contract and claim approach
is what Jerry and Richmond define as a “fundamental question: the extent to
which courts [and legislatures] will allow insurers to utilize inaccuracies in
information provided by the insured to deny coverage.”32
Lord Mansfield established the early contours of this area by
distinguishing between a representation and a warranty:
There is a material distinction between a warranty and a
representation. A representation may be equitably and substantially
answered but a warranty must be strictly complied with…. A warranty in a
policy of insurance is a condition or a contingency, and unless that be
performed, there is no contract.33
This formulation and its subsequent elaboration set a framework for
problems about inadequate or incorrect information provided by a
policyholder. A warranty is “a statement or promise by the insured, set forth
or incorporated in the policy, which if untrue or unfulfilled provides the
insured with a defense to coverage.”34 A representation, in turn, is a
statement that only provides a defense to coverage if it is false, material to
32

ROBERT H. JERRY & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 717 (5th ed. 2012).
33
De Hahn v. Hartley (1786) 99 Eng. Rep. 1130, 1131; 1 T.R. 343, 345346.
34
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 32, at 718.
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the risk, relied on by the insurer, and in some jurisdictions made with intent
to deceive.35
The logic of this framework is traditionally contractual and reflects
the insurer’s conception of policy formation. The insurance policy is a
contract, and the law’s primary purpose is to enforce the legitimate
expectations of the parties created by the contract. Where the parties have
chosen to establish a statement or promise as a warranty, the disappointment
of their planning by a breach provides a legitimate basis for nonperformance
by the insurer. In the ordinary case, however, legitimate expectations
distinguish between the essential and the peripheral. Therefore, the law does
not convey the power to avoid a contract for every failure to conform to the
information but only for the essential; that is the basis for the general contract
doctrine that a contract can be avoided only for a misrepresentation that is
false, material, relied upon, and intentionally made. But where the parties
choose to do so, they can import a higher standard by making a statement a
warranty, essentially designating it as material per se and removing the
requirements of reliance and intent.
In addition to reflecting the insurer’s approach to formation, the
representations and warranties rules address the insurer’s concern with
policyholder agency at the point of formation. A potential policyholder has
better information about its risk profile than the insurer. Where the
information would demonstrate an increased risk, it is in the policyholder’s
interest to conceal or misrepresent the information in order to obtain
coverage that might not otherwise be available or to obtain coverage at a
lower premium. This is, of course, the problem of adverse selection. The
insurer has some mechanisms to obtain or verify this information, but the
mechanisms are limited, and the insurer must rely to a large extent on the
policyholder’s statement. Assuming that most potential policyholders give
accurate information, it is not economical to invest the resources necessary
to check on the policyholder at the point of formation; indeed, in some cases
it will not be possible at all. At the point of claim, however, it often becomes
economically justifiable and there may or may not be indicators of
misrepresentation. In case of a loss and a subsequent claim, the insurer may
assert that the policyholder failed to provide accurate information from
which the insurer could perform appropriate underwriting as a basis for
denying the claim. This cures the information asymmetry and allows the

35

Id. at 721-22.
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insurer to refuse the risk.36
But the warranty-representation distinction and its functions have
turned out neither to be a strict rule nor easy to enforce. Instead, the rule is
rife with exceptions which the Jerry and Richmond treatise helpfully
categorizes.
First, to constitute a warranty the promise or statement must be
included in the policy either expressly or by express incorporation by
reference, and the inclusion must show that the parties intended the inclusion
to operate as a true warranty. Courts strictly apply the requirements, so any
ambiguity or technical failure will lead to the creation of a representation,
with its less severe consequences,37 or as a means of identifying insured
property but neither warranty nor representation.38
Second, statements by the policyholder can be either affirmative,
referring to a fact at the time the statement is made, or promissory,
constituting a promise that state of facts will continue into the future. Courts
will interpret statements as promissory to avoid the effect of a warranty.39
Third, even when finding a warranty, courts often will interpret it
narrowly. A well-known example is Vlastos v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins.
Co. (Europe) Ltd.40 An endorsement expressly incorporated into the policy
stated, “[w]arranted that the 3rd floor is occupied as a Janitor’s residence.”
The court held that this provision was indeed a warranty but because it did
not unambiguously state that the janitor’s occupancy was the exclusive use
of the 3rd floor, the warranty was not breached by the partial occupancy of
a massage parlor. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on contra
proferentem, extrinsic evidence to establish an ambiguity, “the context of the
remainder of the policy, and of the alleged purposes of the warranty,” all
factors removed from the strict warranty-representation distinction.
Fourth, “a court might interpret the warranty as only extending to a
particular risk or a severable part of the policy [so that] the breach of
36

“Strict enforcement protects insurers by limiting indemnity to cases
where the insured has answered all application questions honestly; strict
enforcement deters applicants from making false representations; integrity
in insurance contracts is promoted, and fraud and perjury are deterred; and a
strict rule is simple to enforce.” Id. at 720.
37
Id. at 718-19, 725.
38
Id. at 725.
39
Id. at 724.
40
Vlastos v. Sumitomo Marine and Fire Ins. (Eur.) Co., 707 F.2d 775
(3d Cir. 1983).
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warranty under one kind of risk will not avoid the policy with respect to other
parts of the coverage.”41
Fifth, even if there is a breach of warranty, it may be construed as a
“temporary breach” the cure of which before a loss revives coverage.42
Sixth, the traditional doctrine has been undercut by statutes in most
states; these statutes vary. One common limitation allows a warranty to
operate to avoid coverage only where the breach of warranty is material.43
Others require that the misrepresentation was made with actual intent to
deceive,44 or that the failure to conform to the warranty contributed to the
loss,45 or some combination of these.46
Seventh, and perhaps most dramatically, are incontestability
provisions.47 Life insurance policies and many disability policies, usually
under statutory mandate, are incontestable after two years, so that an insurer
may not assert defenses such as breach of warranty to defeat payment of the
policy proceeds.48
Some of the exceptions can fit within the conception of the insurance
policy as a contract, particularly a contract that is not presentiated in the
policy but instead constructed by broader relations. For example, requiring
that the warranty be included in the policy expressly or by express
incorporation by reference represents a traditional view of contract. But
narrowing interpretations such as in Vlastos rest on a broader conception of
contract. Many courts today may be less prone to apply formal distinctions
41

JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 32, at 726.
Id. at 726-27.
43
E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 3105 (McKinney 2001).
44
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 186 (2008).
45
IOWA CODE § 515.101 (2009).
46
E.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.409 (2014); UTAH CODE § 31A-21-105(2)
(2003).
47
See Eric K. Fosaaen, Note, AIDS and the Incontestability Clause, 66
N.D. L. REV. 267, 267-77 (1990).
48
Incontestability clauses were originally included in policies to combat
public mistrust of the insurance industry, a mistrust that often was justified.
See, E.g., Baumgart v. Modern Woodmen of Am., 55 N.W. 713, 714 (Wis.
1893). But insurers faced a collective action problem; an insurer that
included a clause incurred higher costs but did not reap all the benefits of
improved reputation of the industry as a whole. That phenomenon, along
with exposés of industry abuses, led to the widespread adoption of statutes
requiring incontestability clauses. See Fosaaen, supra note 47, at 269-270.
42
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and doctrines to defeat the policyholder’s expectations altogether.49
The development of so many exceptions to and restrictions of the
doctrine demonstrate unease with its application by courts and legislatures.
That unease is best captured in the contract and claim analysis.
In part, the exceptions reflect unease with the exclusive focus on the
insurer’s conception of the policy at formation. The policyholder’s
conception focuses not on the policy as representing the agreement but on
the written policy and the application process that gives rise to it as the
formal elements of a broader, less formal relation. In that relation, loss of
coverage for a statement that is ambiguous, for example, is inconsistent with
the perception of security.
More importantly, the exceptions demonstrate a concern with
insurer agency at the point of performance and the claim dynamics that limit
the policyholder’s ability to control that agency. This concern focuses on the
claim process and the possibility of an insurer using the doctrine
opportunistically. An insurer may assert breach of warranty to avoid
coverage even if the information misrepresented had no effect on its
underwriting. More generally, an insurer may under-invest in underwriting
at the point of formation, await high-value claims or claims that are in any
way suspect, and then perform an investigation that reveals a policyholder
misrepresentation. At its extreme, this is the particularly egregious form of
opportunism known as “post-claim underwriting.”50 When a claim is
presented, a company can seize on errors by the insured in the application to
deny coverage. And some insurers have systematically exploited the
doctrines by designing an application process that would make
misrepresentations a virtual certainty.51 The exceptions to the warrantyrepresentation rule respond to the range of these types of behavior.
Jerry and Richmond are themselves skeptical of many of the
mitigating doctrines, favoring bright-line rules to control adverse selection
and moral hazard. But their analysis demonstrates that the prevailing view
favors a focus on claims, with the presence of agency and the potential for
opportunism:
[I]t must be assumed that those who make public policy believe that
49

JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 32, at 720.
See Thomas C. Cady & Georgia Lee Gates, Post Claim Underwriting,
102 W. VA. L. REV. 809 (2000).
51
See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. V. Union Trust Co., 112 U.S. 250 (1884);
Baumgart, 55 N.W. 713; Cady & Gates, supra note 50.
50
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the instances of insurer use of warranties to gain advantage over
unsophisticated insureds greatly outweigh the circumstances in
which insurers use warranties to reduce costs for the benefit of all
policyholders.52
B.

DURING PERFORMANCE: INTERPRETATION AND REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS

More challenging is the application of the contract and claim
analysis to perhaps the largest set of issues in insurance law, the
interpretation of the terms of an insurance policy and the associated doctrine
of reasonable expectations. This is not the place for a comprehensive theory
of interpretation and reasonable expectations.53 The issues are complex, the
case law is voluminous, and the commentary is rich. The contract and claim
analysis does provide insight into both particular interpretation doctrines and
general approaches to interpretation and the role of reasonable expectations.
A series of related controversies pervades the law of insurance
contract interpretation. Those controversies include:
•
•
•

A preference for a plain meaning approach to interpretation
versus a preference for a contextual or functional approach.
Determining whether a policy is ambiguous solely by using the
terms of the policy and a general dictionary versus resorting to
extrinsic evidence.
The choice between a narrow version of the reasonable
expectations doctrine in which reasonable expectations function
at most as an interpretive tool versus a broad version in which
reasonable expectation can trump unambiguous policy
language.

The controversies reflect two contrasting visions of interpretation
and of contract law more generally. At the level of interpretation, the
textualist vision presumes that the parties have embodied their agreement in
the express words of the policy, so courts should, to the extent possible, only
resort to those words as generally understood to determine the scope of their
obligation. The opposed vision suggests that parties express their agreements
through words and conduct in commercial and social contexts, so words,
52

JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 32, at 733.
“The rules that courts apply to interpret insurance policies are
surprisingly difficult to define.” Geistfeld, supra note 14, at 371.
53
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conduct, and context are all potentially relevant to supplement the express
words of the policy. This dispute reflects more fundamental oppositions in
constructing the role of contract law, described at various levels and in
various ways, such as between a formalist and a functionalist approach, or
between an individualist and collectivist approach.54
The insurer and policyholder approaches to formation in the contract
and claim analysis resonate with these more fundamental conflicts. The
insurer places great emphasis on the express terms of the policy as
embodying the substantial terms of its obligation to the policyholder. The
insurer generally has a preference for formality—the plain meaning rule—in
interpreting the policy. Plain meaning presumes that insurers will draft terms
clearly as the basis of their underwriting and by and large those terms will
conform to the reasonable expectations of policyholders. The terms of the
policy define the risk it has assumed across many such policies and help to
stabilize its internal and external relations.55 If the express terms are
uncertain as applied, often they can be made more certain by prior regulatory
or judicial interpretations and industry understandings, all of which are
within the insurer’s knowledge and expertise. Formality, supplemented if
necessary, provides more certainty and reduces litigation costs. Both of those
elements support the risk allocation system embodied in the policy as one
among many. Therefore, the insurer’s model favors plain meaning and a
focus on express terms rather than extrinsic evidence and fears a broad resort
to reasonable expectations as upsetting planning and increasing costs.
For the policyholder, by contrast, the policy provision involves little
explicit planning and agreement and instead reflects agreement on a few key
terms and blanket assent to not-unreasonable other terms and, more
generally, to a relationship of security. Therefore, interpreting the policy
terms strictly—terms that the policyholder has neither bargained for,
explicitly agreed to, or even read—may disappoint the policyholder’s
expectations. Instead, the process of interpretation should depart from the
express terms in favor of extrinsic evidence56 and reasonable expectations to

54

See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL & ERIK S. KNUTSEN, STEMPEL AND
KNUTSEN ON INSURANCE COVERAGE at 4-7 to 4-11; JERRY & RICHMOND,
supra note 32, at 129-31; E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 419-23 (4th
ed. 2004); Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA
L. REV. 829, 838-47 (1983).
55
See supra text accompanying note 8.
56
Extrinsic evidence may include:
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more closely honor the true agreement; doing so benefits the individual
policyholder, other policyholders who actually suffer a loss, and, in an
indirect way, all policyholders whose expectation of security is strengthened.
The contract and claim analysis does more than define the
contrasting positions of insurer and policyholder at the point of formation. It
also requires a focus on the moment of performance and the dynamics of the
claim process at that moment, and therefore demonstrates that interpretation
cannot properly be accomplished solely by focusing on the policy as a
product of contract formation. The analysis suggests that at the point of
performance, both insurer and policyholder are subject to the risk of agency
by the other, the claim dynamics affect the risks and the means of controlling
them, and the policyholder is at a systematic disadvantage in the process.57
This is relevant to interpretation questions in three ways.
First, at the point of claim, the insurer is subject to agency by the
policyholder, who controls much of the information relevant to the claim.
Some terms of the policy may exacerbate or reduce this risk, and
interpretation of such terms should be sensitive to the need to promote the
flow of information from the policyholder that is contractually required and
consistent with the underwriting purposes of the term.
Second, when an insurer drafts a policy term, it looks forward to the
point of claim. The insurer can use its power to draft and its knowledge of
the tools courts will use in interpreting policies and the way particular
provisions have been interpreted to define terms in a way that may be
inconsistent with the policyholder’s expectations of a relation of security and
coverage. Where the insurer adopts a standard form such as an ISO policy,

pre-contractual negotiations, the parties’ course of performance
under the policy at issue, the course of dealing between the parties
with regard to other policies, the drafting history of insurance
policies, documents filed with state administrative agencies
regarding an insurance policy or term, other versions of the relevant
term available on the market, other forms of insurance available on
the market, and expert testimony regarding topics such as the
custom and practice in the insurance industry and the history,
purpose, and function of policy terms and forms of insurance
coverage.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW LIAB. INS. § 3, cmt. f (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016).
57
See supra text accompanying notes 19-29.
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its knowledge of the tools courts use and their past interpretations of the
policy is more important. The agency problem is even more extreme where
the insurer drafts and employs unique terms that are narrower than the
standard terms and therefore even more to the disadvantage of the
policyholder and even more inconsistent with its reasonable expectations.58
This is true in individual cases and is part of the broader phenomenon of
hollowing out coverage and fragmenting risk.
Third, at the point of claim it can exploit the results of its drafting
and its advantages in the claim process to take advantage of either clarity or
ambiguity in policy terms. Insurers do have an incentive to draft clearly so
they can underwrite on that basis. Because of the different positions of
insurer and policyholder at the time of formation, some portion of that clarity
will be clear drafting that reduces coverage in a way that is inconsistent with
widely held expectations of policyholders. In many cases, that drafting will
constitute the single plain meaning which courts will enforce.
This is hardly new. In a well-known article, Clarence Morris
describes the phenomenon:
American draftsmen-lawyers, sometimes in the hire of fly-by-night
companies, proliferated fine print in the nineteenth century fire and life
insurance policies. Companies, spurred by competition, debased their
product (as the Germans did their linen). Restrictions on coverage, not
noticed or not understood by policyholders at the time of issue, became
painfully clear after uncovered losses which policyholders would have paid
to cover.59
Although an insurer has an incentive to draft clearly, it either cannot
do so or chooses not to do so in every case. Nevertheless, an insurer may not
suffer much or any cost from drafting an ambiguous term. Because of the
dynamics of the claim process, a policyholder might defer to its perception
of an insurer’s expertise and accept the insurer’s interpretation of an
58

Compare ISO, HO 53 ‒ Homeowners 3 ‒ Special Form, Section I ‒
Conditions, C. Loss Settlement (HO 00 03 05 01, 2000), with Farmers
Insurance Group, Farmers Smart Plan Home Policy, NEV. DIV. OF INS., 1,
29-30 (last visited Oct. 8, 2018), http://doi.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/doinvgov/_
publicdocuments/Consumers/Home/Farmers/56-5640_6-15.pdf (regarding
payment for matching of damaged property).
59
Clarence Morris, Waiver and Estoppel in Insurance Policy Litigation,
105 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 926 (1957) (footnote omitted) (Morris also sums up
a solution: “The insurance market might have soured had not the law stepped
in and afforded consumer protection greater than companies intend to sell.”).
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ambiguous term as correct, a policyholder might disagree with the
interpretation but not have the means to dispute it, or, particularly in a lowstakes case, a policyholder might conclude that it is not worthwhile to do so.
If the policyholder pursues a dispute, the insurer’s interpretation will prevail
in some cases. Where it does not, and the term is interpreted against the
insurer, in most cases the result will be a small effect on its underwriting
which can be accounted for going forward.60
The contract and claim analysis accordingly suggests some insights
about the process of interpretation. As a starting point, in interpreting policy
language, both of the conflicting models of contract in general and
interpretation in particular, and their doctrinal implications, have
contributions to make, neither is entirely correct, and each taken to an
extreme or considered in isolation produces undesirable results. A pure view
of plain meaning is wrong because it ignores the policyholder’s conception
of formation and the dynamics of the claim process; a too-expansive concept
of reasonable expectations similarly ignores legitimate concerns of the
insurer at the point of formation.
That suggests that any approach to interpretation needs to be
attentive to multiple factors:
•
•
•
•
•

The insurer’s conception of the contract embodied in the policy
at the point of formation, which favors adherence to the ordinary
meaning of the text.
The policyholder’s conception of the contract at the point of
formation, which is focused on a relation of reasonable security
not fully embodied in the express terms.
The problem of policyholder agency through the control of
information at the point of claim.
The problem of insurer agency at the point of claim, which tends
toward opportunism
The dynamics of the claim process, in which the policyholder is
at a systematic disadvantage.

In interpreting a policy term, a court needs to take account of these
factors. Interpretation is never carried out in the abstract; the court evaluates
and balances the factors in the context of the particular dispute.61 The result
60

See Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of
Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1124 (2006).
61
On balancing as the defining characteristic of modern law, see
Feinman, supra note 53, at 838.
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of that process may be more or less clear, but it is necessary to effectuate the
interests involved.
Consider two examples of how this analysis can be applied, using
casebook staples, one of which presents a relatively clear result under the
contract and claim analysis and one that requires more complex balancing.
Prudence Life Insurance Co. v. Wooley required the interpretation
of the key term under a general disability policy.62 Derwood Wooley was a
chicken farmer who previously had worked as a carpenter, truck driver and
construction equipment operator. Wooley purchased a form of “general
disability” policy63 that contained this definition of total disability:
“Complete loss of business time due to the inability of the insured to engage
in his regular occupation or in any gainful occupation for which he is
reasonably fitted by education, training or experience.” Wooley suffered a
heart attack and the insurer paid benefits for two years and then ceased doing
so, asserting that he no longer was totally disabled within the meaning of the
policy.64 At trial the issue was whether Wooley’s proof that he could no
longer be a chicken farmer was sufficient, or whether the jury also should be
charged that the policy required that he be unable to perform any other
occupation “for which he is reasonably fitted by education, training or
experience.”65 The court adopted the majority rule that a general disability
term requires not only that an insured be unable to perform his own
occupation but that he also be unable to perform another occupation for
which he is suited.66
The contract and claim analysis would reach the same result. Both
insurer and insured contract in a market in which there is a clear distinction
between a general disability policy and an occupational disability policy. The
former has what the Wooley court referred to as “a ‘double-barrel provision,’
which requires that disability be shown as inability to follow his regular
occupation, or any other occupation for which insured is reasonably fitted by
education, training or experience.” The latter only has the requirement that
the insured be unable to perform his own occupation. In the market for
disability insurance, both types are available, the choice between them is
readily apparent to the reasonable insured, and the distinction is represented
62

Prudence Life Ins. Co. v. Wooley, 182 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1966).
See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 32, at 464.
64
Prudence Life Ins. Co., 182 So. 2d at 395, citing 29A AM. JUR. INS. §
1518 at 622-3-4 (1960).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 396.
63
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by a difference in price to the policyholder and in underwriting to the insurer.
At the point of claim any informational advantage possessed by the
policyholder can be overcome by medical examination, testing, and
investigation by the insurer. There is a potential for opportunism by the
insurer, by denying a claim and forcing a disabled insured to litigation to
receive benefits. In fact, that potential often has been realized in disability
insurance cases.67 But the potential is in concept not dramatically greater in
disability cases than in many other types. On balance, the contract and claim
analysis supports the insurer’s interpretation of the policy and the result in
Wooley.
A second example is the burglary provision in mercantile policies,
of which the casebook classics are C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual
Insurance Co.68 and Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western National Mutual
Insurance Co.69 The definition of burglary in the policy is the felonious
abstraction of insured property from within the premises by a person making
felonious entry therein by actual force and violence, of which force and
violence there are visible marks made by tools, explosives, electricity or
chemicals upon, or physical damage to, the exterior of the premises at the
place of such entry.70
In the cases, the loss of property through an obvious burglary occurs
but there are no such visible marks on the exterior. The conflict in the cases
is whether to use a plain meaning approach that bars coverage or to resort to
a reasonable expectations approach that might find coverage.
The courts note that for the insurer at the point of formation, there
are two reasons for the visible marks requirement: to exclude coverage for
“inside jobs” and to encourage policyholders to secure their premises.71 Both
reasons are related to the insurer’s risk allocation, designed to cover “real”
burglaries and to reduce their incidence. But for the insurer, the clause also
looks forward to the point of claim. Some losses caused by an inside job may
be fraudulent, and the clause excludes coverage for those. In other cases it
will be unclear whether the loss was due to burglary or an inside job, and the
effect of the clause’s proof requirement is to use an objective standard to
67

See Jay M. Feinman, The Law of Insurance Claim Practices: Beyond
Bad Faith, 47 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 693, 716 (2012).
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C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa
1975).
69
Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271
(Minn. 1985).
70
Id. at 275.
71
Id. at 276.
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foreclose a more extended and uncertain inquiry into the nature of the loss
and to conveniently exclude coverage in those cases.
From the policyholder’s perspective, however, at formation the
reasonable understanding of the provision is to pay for a burglary as
comports with the general understanding of the term, as not an inside job. At
the point of claim, a requirement of objective proof disappoints that
expectation. Moreover, the policyholder is at risk of insurer agency because
the requirement does more than place the burden on the policyholder to
establish the cause of loss; it prevents the policyholder from proving that the
cause was an actual burglary. It also gives the insurer discretion in applying
the clause favorably to some policyholders and unfavorably to other, and it
provides a disincentive to policyholders to pursue claims, particularly in
cases involving relatively small claims.
The general disability cases present a relatively clear application of
the contract and claim analysis, but the burglary cases are more complex and
the resolution is less clear. Because the contract and claim analysis is more
complex than, say, plain meaning purports to be, that may sometimes be the
result. In individual cases particular facts may be decisive. In C & J
Fertilizer, for example, the policyholder testified to his understanding of the
policy at the time of purchase, that understanding was that burglary but not
an inside job was covered, the understanding comported with general usage
of the term, and the proof requirement was in a definition rather than an
exclusion.72
C.

AT THE POINT OF CLAIM: FALSE SWEARING AND BAD FAITH

Whatever the substantive issues underlying a claim dispute, either
party may assert that the other has violated some standard during the claim
process itself. The insurer may assert that the policyholder has violated its
obligations by making a false statement in presenting its claim, an issue
covered by the false swearing rule. Or the policyholder may assert that the
insurer has improperly handled the claim; these issues are resolved under the
law of insurance claim practices, what is commonly known as “bad faith” or,
in a growing term, the law of extracontractual liability.
1.

False Swearing

Most insurance policies explicitly include a term declaring that fraud
72

C & J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 171-72.
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or other false statements by the policyholder in filing a claim permit the
insurer to void the policy.73 Many of those terms require that the false
statement concern a material fact or be made with an intent to deceive the
insurer.74 The misrepresentation provision in the most widely used
homeowners insurance policy lists three circumstances in the alternative, any
of which would result in a loss of coverage, if the policyholder has:
•
•
•

Intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or
circumstance;
Engaged in fraudulent conduct; or
Made false statements.75

The doctrine that applies to these provisions is the “false swearing”
rule. As a general rule “false swearing” by an insured in a proof of loss or
other element of the claim process enables the insurer to avoid paying a
claim, even if the false swearing concerned only a portion of the loss.76
Courts vary on the stringency of their application of the false swearing rule.77
A broad, insurer-favorable version of the false swearing rule has generous
standards for materiality and intent, no reliance requirements, and has the
effect of avoiding the insurer’s obligations under the policy altogether.
Narrower versions of the rule require that the insurer have relied on the
misrepresentation78 or that false swearing enables an insurer to avoid
coverage only as to the portion of the claim that was misrepresented.79
The justification for the broad rule rests on a particular conception
of the insurance policy as a contract and on a focus on opportunism by the
policyholder. The essential rationale for a broad view conceives of the
insurance relation as created and substantially embodied in the insurance
policy. Part of the insured’s contractual obligation with the insurer is to
73

13 STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 197:1 (3d ed.
2018).
74
Id. § 197:33.
75
INS. SERVS. OFFICE, HOMEOWNERS-3 SPECIAL FORM (2010).
76
STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 53, § 9.08[C], at 9-221; JERRY &
RICHMOND, supra note 32, § 83; Versloot Dredging BV and another v. HDI
Gerling Industrie Versicherung AG and others [2016] UKSC 45, ¶ 1 (Eng.).
77
5af-157f APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE ARCHIVE §
3587 (2nd ed. 2011).
78
Id. at § 197:4, at 1.
79
STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 53, § 908[C], at 9-22, 222.
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refrain from misrepresentation in the claim process.80 This element of the
analysis is an instance of a principle of insurance law reflected in the
insurer’s perception of formation, that the relation between insurer and
insured is created and substantially defined by their agreement.81
The reason such a provision is included in the policy is not only
general to contracts; it is specific to insurance because of the risk of
opportunistic behavior by the policyholder at the point of claim. A
policyholder has an incentive to misrepresent or conceal information from
its insurer during the claim process in order to maximize its recovery.82
Insurers, being aware of this possibility, must invest resources to monitor
insureds’ behavior and to ferret out their fraud. The false swearing doctrine
deters wrongful behavior by policyholders and reduces the need for
inefficient monitoring behavior by insurers. In that way, it benefits the pool
of policyholders that otherwise would be subject to increased costs of
fraudulent payments and inefficient monitoring.83
The contract and claim analysis challenges the broad approach to
false swearing as partial. The broad approach recognizes the insurer’s
conception of the contract at the point of formation but fails to recognize the
policyholder’s conception. A policy term on misrepresentation should be
read in light of a reasonable understanding of the insurance relation as shaped
both by policy language and more general norms and expectations of
coverage and process. The policyholder’s expectation of coverage would be
disappointed by a broad false swearing rule. Fraudulent behavior by
80

The obligation is clear and specific where the insurance policy
contains a provision relating to misrepresentation after a loss. Even if the
provision is less specific, it reasonably is interpreted to apply to post-loss
conduct as well as to misrepresentations in the course of applying for the
insurance.
81
See Abraham, supra note 1, at 658.
82
As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated the concern, “Such
misrepresentations strike at the heart of the insurer’s ability to acquire the
information necessary to determine its obligations and to protect itself from
false claims.” Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co. of New Jersey, 582 A.2d 1257,
1261 (N.J. 1990). See also James Davey & Katie Richards, Deterrence,
Human Rights and Illegality: The Forfeiture Rule in Insurance Contract
Law, 2015 LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 314, 318 (2015).
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Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories,
Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395,
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policyholders runs a spectrum from the callously deceitful, as the functional
equivalent of stealing, to the improper but less ill-spirited, to make up for an
inadequacy of record-keeping or a careless decision to under-insure. That
behavior may cause an insurer to fail to properly investigate a cause of loss
or incur significant additional expense in investigating a claim, or it may
have no effect at all. Where the behavior is toward the less deceitful end of
the spectrum and it does not affect the insurer’s behavior, the loss of the
entire value of the policy to the policyholder is too extreme a sanction.
A focus on the dynamics of the claim process also gives a different
picture of the risks of opportunism. The risk of policyholder opportunism
may be exaggerated, there are other mechanisms in place to deal with it, and
there is a related risk of insurer opportunism.
Policyholder fraud is a familiar theme in discussions about
insurance, both within the industry and in outreach to the public at large. 84
The empirical claim is that fraud is widespread.85 The response that this
claim justifies is a multi-front war on fraud. Sophisticated predictive
analytics trigger identification of potentially fraudulent claims. Insurance
companies contain Special Investigation Units to which claims of fraud are
referred for more aggressive investigation. Insurance regulators and
prosecutors in most states have established distinct units to seek civil and
criminal penalties for fraud, and legislation often requires insurers to report
suspected cases of fraud to them.86 All states now make insurance fraud a
crime, with two-thirds of the states treating it as a felony. 87 So to the extent
that there is a problem, the false swearing doctrine is only one among many
potential solutions, reducing its importance.
The false swearing doctrine aims to respond to opportunism by the
insured. One might consider the problem of opportunism by the insurer to be
entirely separate so that it is irrelevant to the false swearing doctrine and
should be addressed through entirely separate doctrines and remedies. But in
fact, the two problems are linked. One potential form of insurer opportunism
is the assertion of fraud by the policyholder as a reason for not paying a
84

FEINMAN, supra note 28, at ch. 10.
According to the Coalition Against Insurance Fraud, “Insurance fraud
is one of America's largest crimes—at least $80 billion is stolen each year.”
Fraud: Why Worry?, COALITION AGAINST INS. FRAUD, http://www.insuran
cefraud.org/fraud-why-worry.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2019).
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claim. An insurer could use allegations of fraud as part of a broader scheme
to deny payment of valid claims. Or it could make use of the non-reliance
false swearing rule in a parallel way to post-claim underwriting. If an insurer
discovers a misrepresentation during the course of its investigation of a
claim, it can use the misrepresentation as a basis for denying the claim even
if the misrepresentation played no part in its investigation, just as an insurer
in past times could use a misrepresentation on the application even if the
misrepresentation played no role in its underwriting decision.88 The doctrine
that enforces and evaluates that reason becomes a tool for opportunism, and
the severe consequences of a finding of false swearing raises the stakes
considerably. Therefore, with respect to false swearing in the claim process,
agency and opportunism are present on both sides and the better rule of false
swearing would recognize that.
Under the contract and claim analysis, resolving the challenge of
both types of opportunism once again requires balancing, here weighing the
relative risk and severity of each type. How likely are insureds to control
relevant information and at what expense could insurers discover it? If an
insurer asserts fraud, how likely is an insured to contest its determination?
How likely are insurers to opportunistically deny claims? How often does
that behavior take the form of improper assertions that the insured’s claim is
fraudulent?
Empirical data on that question are hard to come by and subject to
interpretation. 89 An analogous instance of balancing insurer, policyholder,
and pool interests in cases of misrepresentation involves misrepresentation
or concealment at the front end of the insurance relationship, in the
application process, as discussed above. Information provided by the insured
in the process of applying for an insurance policy should play a significant
part in the underwriting decision of the insurer—whether to issue the policy,
with what terms of coverage, and at what rate. In the classic example of
“post-claim underwriting,” however, life insurance companies failed to do
proper investigation before issuing the policy; after a claim was filed, they
would refuse to pay death benefits, asserting that the insured had
misrepresented his physical condition or medical history when applying for
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See text at notes 32-36 supra.
The most authoritative quantitative study of insurance fraud
concluded, for example, that the ratio of fraud alleged and reported by
insurance companies to actual, provable fraud, was about 25 to 1. Richard
A. Derrig, Insurance Fraud, 69 J. RISK & INS. 271 (2002).
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the policy, which rendered the policy void.90 These practices caused
disproportionate forfeiture because the insured’s beneficiaries lost the
benefit of the policy because of a minor error, perhaps knowing or perhaps
unintentional, that may or may not have affected the insurer’s underwriting
decision. Even worse, companies sometimes required voluminous but vague
disclosures on the application for insurance to set up the misrepresentation
argument,91 a clear instance of insurer opportunism. Over time, legislatures
and courts recognized this problem and responded in various ways, such as
through doctrines of incontestability, waiver, estoppel, and materiality of
misrepresentation.92 Those doctrines attempt to balance the interests of
insurer, insured, and pool in checking agency and opportunism on both sides
of the insurance relation.
This suggests the advantage of a false swearing rule that at least has
a serious requirement of materiality and includes an element of reliance. If
an insurer has not been affected at all by a policyholder’s misrepresentation,
the entire loss of the relation of security by the policyholder, undermining
the policyholder’s conception of the contract, is too severe a consequence.
Reliance does not need to be immense, but it does need to be tangible. If an
insurer loses the opportunity adequately to investigate the cause of a fire93 or
incurs significant additional investigative expenses, that constitutes
sufficient detrimental reliance; 94 processing the claim independently of the
alleged misrepresentations does not.95
The contract and claim analysis not only provides a perspective on
a variety of substantive doctrinal issues; it also can be used to reframe
elements of the litigation process through which those doctrines are realized.
The process of proof in the application of the false swearing doctrine
provides an example. Some jurisdictions require that the elements of false
swearing be proven by clear and convincing evidence; others use only a
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preponderance of the evidence standard.96 The former is the standard
ordinarily applied in cases involving the tort of fraud, the latter in cases in
which fraud is the basis for avoidance of a contract. The difference follows
from the idea that allegations of fraud are more serious than allegations of
ordinary breach of contract, and “more evidence should be required to
establish grave charges than to establish trifling or indifferent ones.”97
Combining this framework with the contract and claim analysis
suggests that false swearing should require proof by clear and convincing
evidence. Indeed, false swearing in the insurance context is potentially a
more serious matter than some other types of fraud. The insurance contract
properly understood is about security and the consequences for the insured
in losing the security of the insurance policy are often severe or even
catastrophic. Especially where insurer reliance on the misrepresentation is
not required, the trier of fact needs to be more certain that the other elements
are met before attaching such drastic consequences, and more of the risk of
error in fact-finding should be borne by the insurer. And the threat of insurer
opportunism in using allegation of fraud as a strategy to avoid paying
claims—exploiting false claims of false swearing, as it were—suggests that
courts ought to be cautious in enabling an insurer to use a claim of false
swearing to entirely void its obligation under the policy and should assign
the risk of error in fact-finding to the insurer.
2. Bad Faith
In first-party bad faith cases, most jurisdictions require something
more than a negligent failure to investigate or pay a claim to constitute a
violation of claim practices standards, adopting instead the fairly debatable
standard.98 That standard requires the absence of a reasonable basis for
denying the claim—that it was not “fairly debatable”—and intent or
recklessness as to the absence of a reasonable basis. 99 The rationale for this
96

13 STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 197:6 (3d ed.
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97
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rule is based in part on the potential in terrorem effect of bad faith litigation
upon the insurer. “‘An insurer should have the right to litigate a claim when
it feels there is a question of law or fact which needs to be decided before it
in good faith is required to pay the claimant.’”100 Some courts also use a
procedural elaboration on the fairly debatable test. To establish bad faith, the
policyholder is required to prove that it would have been entitled to summary
judgment on the underlying coverage claim.101
The fairly debatable rule embodies strongly the insurer’s perspective
of the contract, that the policy plans in detail the risks covered and excluded.
Underlying the fairly debatable rule is a conception that at the time of
performance, the policy represents an element of the insurer’s portfolio of
risk, with its pricing and place determined by the policy terms. As insurers
often say, an insurer is obligated to pay what is owed, no less but no more.102
Indeed, the insurer should be required to pay no more than what is owed;
otherwise, it would upset the contractual risk allocation and burden the pool
of policyholders.
Of course, the policy language and facts of the loss do not always
lead to a clear conclusion about the insurer’s obligation. Language of
coverage and exclusion may be unclear as applied to the facts of the loss.
And in every case the policy includes only general terms about the insurer’s
To show a claim for bad faith, a plaintiff must show the absence
of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy and the
defendant’s knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a
reasonable basis for denying the claim. It is apparent, then, that the
tort of bad faith is an intentional one. “Bad faith” by definition
cannot be unintentional.
....
Under these tests of the tort of bad faith, an insurance company,
however, may challenge claims which are fairly debatable and will
be found liable only where it has intentionally denied (or failed to
process or pay) a claim without a reasonable basis.
Anderson v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376-77 (Wis.
1978).
100
Polizzi Meats, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 931 F. Supp. 328, 33435 (D.N.J. 1996) (citation omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 271
N.W.2d 368, 377 (Wis. 1978)).
101
Pickett v. Lloyd’s, 621 A.2d 445, 454 (N.J. 1993).
102
E.g., Libby v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2008 WL 2421976 *44 (Cal. App.
Div. Super. Ct. 2008).

2018 CONTRACT AND CLAIM IN INSURANCE LAW

195

obligations in the claim process. In those cases, the fairly debatable rule
empowers the insurer to dispute coverage, as long as it does so for the
purpose of fulfilling its expectations that were created by the policy; that is,
without intent to dispute the claim for improper purposes or reckless
disregard of the reasonableness of its position.
In this respect the fairly debatable rule captures one conception of
the contract. But in doing so, it ignores the form-contract nature of the policy
and the policyholder’s less determinate and more relational expectation
about coverage. It also ignores the policyholder’s expectation that, at the
point of claim, the insurer will act reasonably. More important, it also ignores
the dynamics of the claim process. The rule completely discounts the
insurer’s agency and the risk of opportunism except at the extreme. Instead,
it embodies a conception that only the most egregious intentional acts by the
insurer violate the contract; that the vulnerability of the policyholder, the
information imbalance, and the economics of litigation do not present bars
to finding and pursuing such egregious acts; and that the courts are able to
distinguish the intentionally wrongfully from more ordinary behavior.
A smaller number of jurisdictions apply a reasonableness rule of
liability.103 The duty of the insurer to act in good faith in handling an
insured’s claim is violated when an insurer “fails to deal fairly and in good
faith with its insured by refusing, without proper cause, to compensate its
insured for a loss covered by the policy”104 or “when the insurer
unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment of the claim of its
insured.”105
The rule that requires an insurer to act reasonably recognizes that the
policy imperfectly embodies the insurance relation. Instead, the policy
creates a relation that includes its written terms as well as less determinate
expectations of the policyholder and industry and legal norms. The rule also
recognizes the dynamics of the claim process, in which there is a risk of
insurer opportunism that the policyholder cannot check in the terms of the
contract, because it is an adhesion contract, or at the point of claim, because
of the dynamics. All of those require that the insurer act reasonably in the
claim process.
Reasonableness is not strict liability, however. The reasonableness
rule does not ignore the legitimate interests of the insurer as representative
of the pool; it only requires adherence to widely understood norms. Where
103
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the fairly debatable rule focuses on the risk to the pool if the insurer is
deterred from litigating open questions of law or fact, the contract and claim
approach demonstrates that the reasonableness rule benefits the pool by
providing an appropriate level of incentive with a nontrivial risk of litigation
to enforce the standard, a position that increases the probability that the
insurer will respect the interests of policyholders in future claims.
CONCLUSION
Insurance law scholars are fond of reconceptualizing their subject.
Insurance policies and insurance law have been likened to a means of public
utility regulation, a product warranty, a social institution, or, perhaps mostly
simply, a thing.106 This article represents another conceptualization of the
subject, and one that may be less foreign to the subject and closer to the
reality of the formation and performance of insurance relationships. Insurer
and policyholder approach the insurance relation from different perspectives
at the moment of creation and the point of claim. Insurance law should
recognize those differences and pay particular attention to the dynamics of
the claim process in the resolution of insurance law disputes.
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